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breadth of amending power was available to corporations organized prior to 1927 by
reason of the "reserved power" provision of § 82, following the decision in Davis v.
Louisville Gas & Ekc. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 At. 654 (1928), which had involved
changes in dividend rights for future years but not accumulated unpaid dividends.
It was apparently clear that the 1927 amendment had been intended to apply to
existing corporation. Any contention by minority stockholders of such corporations
that the statute could not have this effect must be based upon the argument that to
give the statute such an operation would interfere with his contractual rights. But the
original statute, including § 82 as well as § 26, must be considered as having been written into any contract between the stockholders or between a stockholder and the corporation. Fletcher, Corporations § 3674 (perm. ed. I931). The crucial question, therefore, is one of the proper construction of the "reserved power clause" in § 82. It has
sometimes been suggested that the reservation should be considered as authorizing
only changes in the "contract" between the corporation and the state and not changes
in shareholders' contracts. Garey v. St. Joe Mit. Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369 (1907);
Avondale Land Co. v. Shook, 170 Ala. 379, 54 So. 268 (1911). This suggestion affords no
solution, however, since any change necessarily affects rights of shareholders. It has
frequently been said that the reserved power does not extend to changes which affect
"vested rights." Yoakam v. Providence Biltnwre Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D.C. R.I.
1929); Fletcher, Corporations § 3680 (perm. ed. 1931). Such a statement, of course,
begs the question, and neither the courts nor other legal writers have been able to state
with any definiteness the proper scope of the power. Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and
Amendments to Corporate Charters, 75 U. Pa.L. Rev. 585, 722 (1927); Curran, Minority Stockholders and theAmeudment of Corporate Charters, 32 Mich.L. Rev. 743 (1934).
In general it has been agreed that changes in which the state or the public may have an
interest will more readily be found to fall within the reserved power. The stockholders
may be said to have been put on notice that such changes might later be forced on the
corporation or authorized by the legislature. The Delaware court in the principal case
and the Davis case cited above has been able to find a public interest behind changes in
preferred stock rights which may facilitate financing or improve corporate credit.
Other courts have taken a contrary view. Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co.,
supra; Pronick v. SpiritsDistributingCo., 58 N.J. Eq. 97, 42 Atl. 586 (1899).
The objecting stockholders' contention becomes a constitutional one when he relies
on the prohibition of state legislation impairing the obligations of contracts. On the
constitutional issue, the state courts' construction of the reserved power provision as
written into the stockholders' contract would not be conclusive since in applying the
contract clause of the Constitution the United States Supreme Court will adopt its own
construction of the contract so as to prevent nullification of its jurisdiction. Jefferson
Branch Bank v. Skelly, i Black (U.S.) 436 (186I).
The principal case probably goes farther than any previous case in extending the
reserved power to cover authorization of changes affecting relative rights of existing
classes of shares. The trend in this direction has been noted. Berle and Means, The
Modern Corporation and Private Property, 213 ff. (1934).
Corporations-Assignability of Claim against Directors for Breach of Fiduciary
Duty-[Massachusetts].-Minority stockholders of X corporation brought a suit in the
right of the corporation against its directors for breach of their fiduciary duty. Shortly
after the bill Was filed the directors, with the consent of the stockholders, sold and con-
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veyed all the property of X corporation to Y corporation. Thereafter, the defendants
claimed that the cause of action vested exclusively in Y corporation. The court assumed the conveyance amounted to an attempted assignment of this cause of action.
Held, the cause of action was not assignable and remained in X corporation. Baker v.
Allen, 197 N.E. 521 (Mass. 1935).
When a cause of action is assignable and when it is not is surrounded with uncertainty. A general rule has been laid down that all causes of action which may be enforced against the estate of the decedent defendan4 are, in general, assignable. 3 Pomeroy, Equity jurisdiction § 1275 (4th ed. 1918). But in the instant case the court assumed that the liability of the defendants would survive. In general wrongs such as
malicious prosecution, slander, and the like, are not assignable before final judgment
because only the injured party can urge to the jury his pain, or suffering, or humiliation, which are the bases for part or all of the damages. 5 CJ. 887 § 53 b. Even when
the injury is to property, but merely in the sense of a depletion of the general estate of
the wrong party, as when he gives up property on the false representations of the defendant, the same result is reached although the same considerations are not present.
Hooker v. Fargo, 45 Mich. 153, 7 N.W. 758 (1881). See also .iurray v. Buell, 76 Wis.
657, 45 N.W. 667 (189o) (injury to business by a conspiracy not assignable). But when
the injury affects a specific property, the cause of action is regarded as an injury to
property, not a personal tort, and is assignable. Byxbie v. Wood, 24 N.Y. 607 (1862).
And when the cause of action sounds in contract it is generally assignable. Hicks v.
Steel, 126 Mich. 408, 85 N.E. 1121 (19o).
Most courts conclude that a director's breach of his fiduciary duty gives rise to an
assignable cause of action. Bigelow v. The Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting
Co., 74 NJ. Eq. 457, 71 Atl. 153 (198o) (so held without a discussion of the point).
Some courts to avoid calling it a personal cause of action utilize the theory that a
property right is violated. Baker v. Sutton, 47 Ga. App. 176, 170 S.E. 95 (1933);
Shulz v. Christman,6 Mo. App. 338 (1878). Others regard the wrong as an injury to
contract rights. Denman v. Richardson, 284 Fed. 592 (1921).
In Massachusetts the principal test of assignability is the effect of the wrongdoing
upon the estate of the wrong party. If it results in an injury to specific property it is
assignable; if it merely depletes the general assets, it is not assignable. United Zinc Co.
v. Harwood, 216 Mass. 474, 1o3 N.E. 1037 (1914) (a case squarely in accord with the
principal case). But the court has not been consistent in the application of the rule.
Thus in two cases, in each of which defendant was being sued for his actions in inducing a third party to break the latter's contract with the assignor, the court reached
opposite results. Lee v. Fisk, 222 Mass. 418, 1og N.E. 833 (I915) (injury to specific
property); BetIdehem FabricatorsInc. v. H. D. Watts Co., 286 Mass. 556, I9o N.E. 828
(1934) (injury merely depleted general assets). And in any case the distinction seems
artificial and tenuous when the practical result is a simple money loss to the wronged
party.
It would be better to discard the various rules and tests for assignability of causes
of action in favor of the simple, practicable rule, that a cause of action is assignable
unless the injury to the reputation, or the pain, humiliation, or suffering of the
wronged party comprises a part of the measure of damages. This would seem a desirable rule since even a strictly personal cause of action is assignable after final judgment
and the damages are no longer dependent upon the feelings of the party. Under such
a rule a corporate cause of action would usually be assignable except, perhaps, in the
case of tortious injuries to corporate credit, etc.

